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Policing in the Era of Permissiveness
MITIGATING MISCONDUCT THROUGH THIRD-
PARTY STANDING
Julian A. Cook III†
INTRODUCTION
On April 4, 2015, Walter L. Scott was driving his vehicle
when he was stopped by Officer Michael T. Slager of the North
Charleston, South Carolina, police department for a broken
taillight.1 A dash cam video from the officer’s vehicle showed the
two men engaged in what appeared to be a rather routine verbal
exchange.2 Sometime after Slager returned to his vehicle, Scott
exited his car and ran away from Slager, prompting the officer to
pursue him on foot.3 After he caught up with Scott in a grassy
field near a muffler establishment, a scuffle between the men
ensued, purportedly over a Taser in Slager’s possession.4 A
bystander began filming the confrontation at this point, capturing
Slager firing his Taser at Scott, the two men tussling, something
† J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B.,
Duke University; M.P.A., Columbia University; J.D., University of Virginia School of
Law. I would like to thank Professors Daniel Coenen, Kim Forde-Mazrui, and Sunita
Patel for their incredible assistance in the development of this article. I would also like
to thank T.J. Striepe, Faculty Services Librarian at the University of Georgia School of
Law, for his invaluable research and technical assistance. In addition, I would like to
thank University of Georgia School of Law students Chip George, Fadi Greene,
Hannah Heltzel, and Jonathan Weeks for their excellent and timely research
contributions. Finally, I extend my gratitude to Lillian Smith, Nina Vershuta, and the
rest of the Brooklyn Law Review for their hard work, dedication, and first-rate
recommendations and assistance.
1 Alan Blinder & Timothy Williams, Ex-South Carolina Officer Is Indicted in
Shooting Death of Black Man, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/06/09/us/former-south-carolina-officer-is-indicted-in-death-of-walter-scott.html
[http://perma.cc/W652-Q4EC] (containing video footage of the fatal shooting).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.; Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with
Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/
us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html [http://perma.cc/
LZ84-LB56].
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falling to the ground, and Scott subsequently attempting to flee.5
With Scott’s back to the officer, Slager, while in an upright,
stationary position, fired eight shots in Scott’s direction, striking
him several times and causing him to fall face down to the
ground.6 After approaching Scott, Slager placed him in handcuffs
before calling and reporting to dispatch that Scott was “down” and
that “[h]e took my Taser.”7 About 90 seconds later, Slager
contacted dispatch for a second time.8 This time, he reported that
Scott was unresponsive and had suffered wounds to various parts
of his body.9 Scott, who was African-American, died at the scene.10
He was 50 years old.11 On June 8, 2015, Slager, who is white, was
indicted for first-degree murder.12
The Walter Scott shooting is but one of a steady stream of
police misconduct cases of late involving white officers and black
individuals that have generated significant media coverage and
public conversation. The Staten Island, New York, chokehold case
involving Eric Garner,13 the Cleveland, Ohio, death of Tamir Rice,
who was 12 years old and was carrying a fake gun in a public park
when he was shot by a police officer,14 the shooting death of
Michael Brown at the hands of a police officer after a confrontation
in Ferguson, Missouri,15 and the Sandra Bland incident in
Hempstead, Texas, where she was stopped for a traffic violation,
threatened by an officer with a Taser, and later found dead in her
5 Blinder & Williams, supra note 1.
6 Id.
7 Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra note 4.
8 Michael Martinez, South Carolina Cop Shoots Unarmed Man: A Timeline,
CNN (Apr. 9, 2015, 10:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-cop-
shoots-black-man-timeline [http://perma.cc/LA48-WLJP].
9 Id. The bystander’s video shows that after calling in the incident, Slager
picked something up from the ground near where the men had tussled—possibly the
Taser—and then dropped it next to Scott’s body. Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra note 4.
10 Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra note 4.
11 Id.
12 Blinder & Williams, supra note 1.
13 Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Died from Chokehold
During Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
08/02/nyregion/staten-island-man-died-from-officers-chokehold-autopsy-finds.html [http://
perma.cc/W8U3-SGRR].
14 Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by
Cleveland Police, Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/20
15/01/23/us/in-tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-police-then-a-fatal-one.html
[http://perma.cc/GNG4-KM9F].
15 Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-
after-police-shooting.html [http://perma.cc/HT6K-38SP] (last updated Aug. 10, 2015).
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jail cell,16 are among the notable events that have thrust the issue
of police misconduct back into the national spotlight.
In her bestselling book, The New Jim Crow, Professor
Michelle Alexander argues that the mass incarceration of blacks
has, in essence, become America’s new racial caste system.17 What
society once achieved through the establishment of Jim Crow
laws, Alexander argues, America now achieves through mass
incarceration. In making her claim, Alexander made the following
declaration with respect to the latitude afforded law enforcement:
The U.S. Supreme Court, for its part, has mostly turned a blind eye to
race discrimination in the criminal justice system. The Court has
closed the courthouse doors to claims of racial bias at every stage of
the criminal justice process from stops and searches to plea bargaining
and sentencing. Law enforcement officials are largely free to
discriminate on the basis of race today, so long as no one admits it.
That’s the key. In McCleskey v. Kemp and United States v. Armstrong,
the Supreme Court made clear that only evidence of conscious,
intentional racial bias—the sort of bias that is nearly impossible to
prove these days in the absence of an admission—is deemed sufficient.
No matter how impressive the statistical evidence, no matter how
severe the racial disparities and racial impacts might be, the Supreme
Court is not interested. The Court has, as a practical matter, closed
the door to claims of racial bias in the criminal justice system.18
Though Alexander’s comments are tailored to the issue of racially
discriminatory law enforcement practices, her comments
highlight an undeniable broader reality: namely, that Supreme
Court jurisprudence has produced a climate highly favorable to
governmental prosecution and investigative interests.
Whereas the Warren Court era was characterized, in
part, by its expansive protections of individual constitutional
liberties, the Supreme Court in the years since has steadily—
and significantly—undermined many of these outcomes. With
the weakening of constitutional safeguards has come an
expansion of law enforcement’s authority to perform their
investigative functions and a corrosive influence on police
organizational culture. This article argues that the Court’s post-
Warren era of investigative permissiveness has contributed to
16 David Montgomery, Sandra Bland Was Threatened with Taser, Police Video
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/us/sandra-bland-was-
combative-texas-arrest-report-says.html [http://perma.cc/NT4S-CWZ3]; David Montgomery,
Sandra Bland Death May Lead to Disciplinary Action, Sheriff Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 25,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/us/sandra-bland-death-may-lead-to-disciplinary-
action-sheriff-says.html [http://perma.cc/65TM-6XHL].
17 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THENEW JIM CROW 2 (rev. ed. 2012).
18 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 18-19
(2011) (footnotes omitted).
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what Professor Barbara Armacost describes as “an overly
aggressive police culture”19 that is increasingly emboldened by
highly favorable search and seizure, interrogation, and
identification laws20 and extremely limited—and forgiving—
exclusionary rule jurisprudence.
The goal of this article is to build upon the academic
literature relevant to the issue of policing and offer a pragmatic,
remedial measure that provides incentives to police agencies to
improve their institutional culture and become more
constitutionally compliant. By focusing on the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and
standing contexts,21 this article demonstrates how the Court, over
the course of many years, has contributed to this problematic
police culture and thus to the associated problems of police
malfeasance. In the end, the article proposes an unprecedented
expansion of the standing doctrine. It argues that as more
aggrieved individuals are empowered to challenge constitutionally
19 Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 455 (2004).
20 Professor Alexander contends that the liberal discretion extended to the
police regarding whom to search, arrest, and charge for narcotics crimes has given them
“free rein” to act upon their “conscious and unconscious” racial attitudes. ALEXANDER,
supra note 17, at 103. Specifically, Alexander commented,
The central question, then, is how exactly does a formally colorblind criminal
justice system achieve such racially discriminatory results? . . . The process occurs
in two stages. The first step is to grant law enforcement officials extraordinary
discretion regarding whom to stop, search, arrest, and charge for drug offenses,
thus ensuring that conscious and unconscious racial beliefs and stereotypes will
be given free rein. Unbridled discretion inevitably creates huge racial disparities.
Then, the damning step: Close the courthouse doors to all claims by defendants
and private litigants that the criminal justice system operates in racially
discriminatory fashion. Demand that anyone who wants to challenge racial bias
in the system offer, in advance, clear proof that the racial disparities are the
product of intentional racial discrimination—i.e., the work of a bigot. This
evidence will almost never be available in the era of colorblindness, because
everyone knows—but does not say—that the enemy in the War on Drugs can be
identified by race.
Id.
21 Standing questions are of rare occurrence in the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
contexts. Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2523, 2526 (1996) (“Standing rarely
comes up as an issue in the Fifth Amendment context because a defendant usually has
standing to contest the use of his or her own statements or their fruits, and the
government generally is precluded from using the out-of-court statements of others as
evidence against a defendant by the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him. . . . For reasons identical to those in the Miranda context,
standing to challenge Massiah violations is rarely an issue because a defendant always
will have standing to object to the admission of his own statements, and the government
rarely will seek to admit the out-of-court statements of others against the defendant
because of separate Confrontation Clause concerns.”).
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questionable police conduct, institutional cultures will, in turn,
adapt to this new reality, thereby producing a climate that fosters
greater respect for constitutional liberties, discourages
unnecessarily aggressive police behaviors, and improves relations
between law enforcement and the majority and minority
communities they serve.
Part I recounts some of the prominent cases decided
during the Supreme Court’s Warren Court years. It was during
this era that individual constitutional safeguards were
interpreted expansively, at least as compared to more recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence. This part will focus primarily on
the Court’s exclusionary rule and standing jurisprudence, with
particular attention devoted to Mapp v. Ohio,22 an infamous
decision that expanded the reach of the exclusionary rule to the
states, Jones v. United States,23 a lesser-known case that
adopted an expansive interpretation of the standing doctrine in
the context of a Fourth Amendment claim, and Alderman v.
United States,24 which rejected the concept of third-party
standing in criminal cases.
Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s era of investigative
permissiveness. Specifically, this part reviews how individual
constitutional protections have been scaled back and law
enforcement investigative liberties expanded in the post–Warren
Court years.25 It also devotes significant attention to the “good
faith” exception to the exclusionary rule and explains how the
Court, in a series of cases, severely constricted the field of
challengers eligible to contest allegedly unconstitutional
government conduct.
Part III sets forth a proposal for reform. It discusses the
influence of police organizational culture on individual officer
behavior and explains how the waning influence of the
exclusionary rule and the severely contracted standing doctrine
have helped promote an institutional culture that often
cultivates police misconduct. To ameliorate this problem, the
proposal calls for the establishment of a standing doctrine even
more robust than that advanced in Jones. Specifically, the
article advocates for an expansive third-party standing approach
22 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961).
23 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1960).
24 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72, 174 (1969).
25 As in Part I, Part II will briefly discuss the Court’s non-exclusionary-rule
jurisprudence but will focus on those cases that pertain more directly to the exclusionary
rule and the issue of standing.
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rooted in the Due Process Clause26 that allows claimants to
assert Fourth Amendment challenges, irrespective of a
defendant’s personal privacy or possessory interests or his
location at the time of the search.
The origins of this proposal are found in two key Supreme
Court cases: Batson v. Kentucky,27 which held that the
government violated the equal protection rights of an African-
American defendant and prospective black jurors when it used its
peremptory challenges to exclude the jurors on account of their
race, and Powers v. Ohio,28 which held that a white criminal
defendant had third-party standing to assert equal protection
claims on behalf of prospective black jurors who, as in Batson,
were stricken solely on account of their race.29 As Part III will
explain in depth, the justifications that underlie the expanded
concept of standing in Powers and its progeny apply with equal—
if not greater—force in the exclusionary rule context.
While this curative proposal is admittedly only a first step,
it is one that is necessary for meaningful institutional change. As
explored more fully in Part III, a broad field of eligible challengers
to government investigative conduct, and a judiciary possessed
with liberal authority to suppress unconstitutionally seized
evidence, will incentivize police organizations to effectuate
institutional cultural change, and enact, implement, and sustain
positive remedial measures and practices. Without these
measures, police reform becomes overly reliant on the good faith
intentions of law enforcement. The problem of policing is too
complex—and too important—to expect positive change in the
absence of extensive and sustained judicial oversight. It is this
reality that underlies the standing proposal set forth in this article.
I. THEWARREN COURT YEARS: THE EXPANSION OF
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
In describing the common thread that runs through the
Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, Professor
Jerold Israel stated that “[t]he Court’s general premise seemed to
be that an expansive interpretation of individual rights should be
26 See Nadia B. Soree, Whose Fourth Amendment and Does It Matter? A Due
Process Approach to Fourth Amendment Standing, 46 IND. L. REV. 753 (2013) (arguing
that individuals have a Due Process Clause right to raise Fourth Amendment
challenges to police investigative conduct irrespective of whether a personal Fourth
Amendment interest has been infringed).
27 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
28 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
29 For a more in-depth discussion of Batson and Powers, see infra Section III.B.
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taken unless adoption of such an interpretation presented
exceptional difficulties.”30
Consistent with Israel’s comment, the Court’s decisions
during this era generally expanded individual constitutional
safeguards. Nevertheless, as Israel observed, the Court rendered
decisions favorable to the government in the Fourth Amendment
context when such “difficulties” presented themselves. Cases such
as Terry v. Ohio, which authorized government stops and frisks
on the basis of reasonable suspicion,31 and Warden v. Hayden,
where the Court expanded the evidence-gathering authority of
the government during the execution of a search,32 are just a
sampling. A third such case, Alderman v. United States, where the
Court declined to extend the standing concept,33 also arguably fits
this paradigm. Similarly, in the Fifth Amendment context, the
Court found in a series of cases that the government can compel
nontestimonial information from an individual without violating
that individual’s privilege against self-incrimination. Drawing a
distinction between compelled knowledge (constitutionally
protected) and compelled physical evidence (not protected), the
Court upheld government-compelled writing exemplars,34 blood
tests,35 and lineup identification procedures.36
A. Expansion of Rights Under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments
Despite the line of decisions that were favorable to
government interests, the Warren Court, more frequently than
not, acted to expand constitutional liberties under the Bill of
Rights. In the Fifth Amendment context, the Court issued the
infamous Miranda v. Arizona decision.37 There, the Court held
that the amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination
clause granted defendants in custody the right to be advised of
certain warnings prior to the commencement of interrogation.38
In the Sixth Amendment sphere, the Court held in Massiah v.
30 Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of
the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1340 (1977).
31 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-30 (1968).
32 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967).
33 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
34 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
35 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
36 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Israel, supra note 30, at 1345.
37 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38 The Court found that individuals who were interrogated while in police
custody must first be advised of their right to remain silent and of their right to have
counsel present during such questioning. Id. at 444-45.
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United States that statements obtained from an undercover
informant from a defendant post-indictment violated the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.39 And in Gideon v.
Wainwright, the Court found that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was a fundamental right, thus entitling indigent state
court defendants who were charged with a felony to the
assistance of counsel.40
The Warren Court also expanded individual safeguards in
several cases presenting Fourth Amendment claims, often
overruling precedent in the process.41 For instance, in Katz v.
United States,42 the Court overruled Olmstead v. United States,43
rejecting the government’s contention that its electronic
eavesdropping on the defendant’s telephone conversations in a
public telephone booth was not a Fourth Amendment search
because it did not involve a physical trespass.44 Instead, the Court
held that the amendment’s protections extended to such
conversations.45 And in Camara v. Municipal Court,46 the Court
held that administrative inspections of homes could not be
performed in the absence of a warrant.47 In concluding that such
inspections were governed by the Fourth Amendment, the Court
overruled Frank v. Maryland,48 which upheld a Baltimore city
code that authorized warrantless entries into an individual’s
residence when there was “cause” to believe that a nuisance
existed within that dwelling.49
B. The Exclusionary Rule
In the exclusionary rule context, certainly no Warren
Court decision was more significant than Mapp v. Ohio, the case
that extended the exclusionary rule to state court actions.50 In so
doing, the Court overruled Wolf v. Colorado, in which the Court
had held that in state court actions involving the prosecution of
39 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 201, 206 (1964).
40 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
41 THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 169,
225, 284 (2009); see Michael Anthony Lawrence, Justice-as-Fairness as Judicial
Guiding Principal: Remembering John Rawls and the Warren Court, 81 BROOK. L. REV.
673, 689-90 (2016).
42 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
43 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
44 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-53.
45 Id.
46 Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
47 Id. at 534.
48 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
49 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
50 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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state criminal offenses, the Fourteenth Amendment did not
proscribe the admission of evidence obtained by virtue of an
unreasonable search or seizure.51
InMapp, police officers went to defendant Mapp’s residence
based on their suspicion that an individual connected with a recent
bombing was “hiding out” there.52 The officers, who did not have a
search warrant for the home, “knocked on the door and demanded
entrance” but were denied admittance by the defendant’s wife.53 A
few hours later, they again sought entry, but when Mapp did not
promptly answer the door, the police forcibly entered the
residence.54 Thereafter, the officers proceeded to conduct a
“widespread search” of the home, finding incriminating evidence in
the process.55 Mapp was tried, and ultimately convicted, pursuant
to an Ohio law prohibiting the possession and control of “certain
lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs.”56 The
government did not introduce a search warrant at the trial and no
explanation was given for this failure to produce.57
In extending the reach of the exclusionary rule to state
court prosecutions, the Court set forth several rationales. First, it
noted that the exclusionary rule had been firmly entrenched in
the federal system since the Court’s 1914 decision in Weeks v.
United States.58 As stated in Wolf, Weeks held “for the first time”
that in the federal system, “the Fourth Amendment barred the
use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure.”59
Mapp added that in the years since Weeks, the Court had
“strict[ly] adhere[d]” to this constitutional mandate.60 And the
Court vigorously emphasized that a failure on the part of the
51 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 645-46. The
Mapp Court noted that in the aftermath of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
[t]his Court has ever since required of federal law officers a strict adherence
to that command which this Court has held to be a clear, specific, and
constitutionally required—even if judicially implied—deterrent safeguard
without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been
reduced to “a form of words.” It meant, quite simply, that “conviction by
means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should find no
sanction in the judgments of the courts . . . .”
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (citations omitted) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J.); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392)).
52 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 645.
56 Id. at 643.
57 Id. at 645.
58 Id. at 647-49.
59 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
60 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
1130 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
state courts to enforce Weeks would nullify the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantees.61
The Mapp Court then turned its attention to Wolf. In
overturning Wolf, the Court stated that it was “clos[ing] the only
courtroom door remaining” that failed to adhere to the Weeks
principle.62 In so doing, the Court firmly declared “that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”63
The Court’s most pointed language was arguably employed
during its discussion of the exclusionary rule’s deterrence rationale.
It vigorously stressed that the threat of exclusion was essential to
ensure government respect for individuals’ Fourth Amendment
rights. It emphasized that, absent this threat, the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable government interference would be
merely “a form of words,” and the sanction of exclusion was
necessary to deter police misconduct and “compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way.”64 Mapp
was direct in its language, consistent in its tone, and unambiguous
in its message. The exclusionary rule was an inherent aspect of the
Fourth Amendment, and without it, the constitutional guarantee
would be an “empty promise.”65
C. The Exclusionary Rule and Standing
A year before Mapp, the Court decided Jones v. United
States, a case that presented a standing issue.66 Jones is far less
celebrated than Mapp and receives, at best, only a passing
reference in a great many law school criminal procedure courses.
Perhaps this is due to its somewhat limited shelf life—the Court
overturned it 20 years later in United States v. Salvucci67—and
the fact the Court began to dismantle Jones prior to its official
demise.68 Yet Jones is important for at least two reasons. Not only
did the case establish a wider avenue through which standing
could be established, but when Jones is viewed in conjunction
with Mapp, it becomes apparent how vastly different the
exclusionary rule landscape was in the 1960s.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 654-55.
63 Id. at 655.
64 Id. at 648, 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
65 Id. at 660.
66 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
67 Unites States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
68 See infra Section II.C.2.
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Jones was a federal narcotics case where the Court
addressed whether the defendant, who was present in an
apartment where he did not reside during the execution of a search
warrant, had standing to contest the search of that residence.69 In
challenging the search, the defendant argued that the warrant was
not supported by probable cause.70 The government countered that
the defendant lacked standing to contest the search, given that he
made no ownership claim in regards to the items taken, and his
relationship to the apartment was nothing more than that of a
guest or invitee.71 At the suppression hearing, the defendant
testified that he did not reside at the apartment, that the owner of
the apartment had given him a key to the residence, that the
defendant used the key to enter the premises on the day of the
search, that he had spent perhaps one night at the apartment,
that he had only a few articles of clothing there, and that he did
not pay any money for use of the apartment.72 The district court
found that the defendant did not have standing to contest the
search.73 This decision was affirmed on appeal.74
The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court opinion on
other grounds but found that the defendant had standing to
contest the search.75 The Jones Court provided two distinct bases
69 Jones, 362 U.S. at 258-59.
70 Id. at 259.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1958), vacated, 362 U.S.
257 (1960).
75 Jones, 362 U.S. at 263-64. The Court referenced Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(e) in deciding the standing issue presented in Jones. That rule provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the
district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of
the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the
ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the
warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that
described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for believing the
existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant
was illegally executed. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact
necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property
shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not be
admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The motion to suppress evidence
may also be made in the district where the trial is to be had. The motion shall
be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the
defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its
discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing.
Id. at 260-61 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)).
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for its conclusion: automatic standing76 and the defendant’s
legitimate presence on the property.77
The Court’s finding that the defendant had automatic
standing addressed a “special problem” presented in Jones.
Prior to Jones, a defendant who was charged with a possessory
offense and sought to challenge the constitutionality of the
government’s search and seizure of that item (and associated
evidence) had a dilemma. If the defendant admitted possession
of the item, he would have standing to challenge the
government’s conduct,78 but his admission could be used
against him at his trial.79 Jones solved this problem by holding
that a defendant faced with this predicament had automatic
standing to contest the government’s conduct.80
The Court reasoned that a contrary holding would allow
the government to reap the benefit of what the Court deemed to
be “contradictory positions.”81 On the one hand, the defendant’s
conviction rested upon the government’s proof that he possessed
the narcotics alleged in the indictment.82 On the other hand, the
fruits of the government’s search were admitted pursuant to the
government’s pretrial claim that he was not in possession of the
narcotics.83 As the Court stated, “It is not consonant with the
amenities, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal
justice to sanction such squarely contradictory assertions of
power by the Government. The possession on the basis of which
petitioner is to be and was convicted suffices to give him
standing . . . .”84
Regarding the second basis for standing cited by the
Court—the defendant’s legitimate presence in the apartment85—
the record established that he was present in the apartment with
the owner’s permission.86 The Court acknowledged that the
government’s position with respect to the standing question—
that those with tenuous connections to the home do not have
standing, while those with more sustained or “domiciled”
76 Id. at 263-64.
77 Id. at 265-67.
78 The Court stated that generally, Courts of Appeals have required that
movants, in order to establish standing, assert ownership or a possessory interest in the
item seized or “a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched.” Id. at 261.
79 Id. at 262.
80 Id. at 264.
81 Id. at 263-64.
82 Id. at 263.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 263-64.
85 Id. at 265-67.
86 Id. at 265.
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relationships have standing—was consistent with the approach
followed by the majority of lower courts.87 The Court in Jones,
however, found it “unnecessary and ill-advised” to engage in
such an exercise involving “subtle distinctions.”88 As the Court
stated, “Distinctions such as those between ‘lessee,’ ‘licensee,’
‘invitee’ and ‘guest,’ often only of gossamer strength, ought not to
be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable
to constitutional safeguards.”89
An additional avenue for standing was also discussed in
Jones. The Court declared that standing can exist when an
individual is “a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom
the search was directed.”90 Thus, this theory of standing
suggests that a claimant can mount a Fourth Amendment
challenge in instances where he had no connection whatsoever
with the searched premises, provided that he was an intended
target of the search.91
Notably, the Court identified a basis upon which standing
could not be established—that is, in instances when an individual
“claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a
consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.”92
Thus, an individual whose basis for standing rests on the
assertion that the evidence the government intends to introduce
against him is the product of an unconstitutional search or
seizure that was directed at another individual will not have his
claim entertained by the court. This statement of limitation would
be relied upon by the Supreme Court a few years later in
Alderman v. United States, when it decided another important
standing question in the context of the exclusionary rule.93
In Alderman, the Court considered whether the
petitioners had standing to urge a Fourth Amendment violation
when their personal constitutional rights had not been
87 Id. Individuals deemed to be mere “guests” and “invitees” to a home were
typically denied standing, while others with more substantial connections to the premises,
such as “owners[] ,” satisfied the standing threshold. Id. at 265-66.
88 Id. at 266.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 261.
91 Id. The Court in Rakas referred to this approach to standing as the “target
theory.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1978).
92 Jones, 362 U.S. at 261.
93 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). In Alderman, three
defendants “were convicted of conspiring to transmit murderous threats in interstate
commerce.” Id. at 167. In a petition for rehearing, it was alleged (and seemingly conceded by
the government) that the government unconstitutionally eavesdropped upon conversations
with one of the defendants in his place of business. Id. at 167-68.
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infringed.94 The Warren Court said no. Finding that there is a
“substantial difference” between asserting constitutional rights
that are personal from those that are not, the Court reasoned that
“the deterrent aim of the rule” provides an insufficient basis to
extend standing to third-party claims.95 The Court explained that
exclusion was unnecessary “in order to protect the rights of
another,” given that “[n]o rights of the victim of an illegal search
are at stake when the evidence is offered against some other
party. The victim can and very probably will object for himself
when and if it becomes important for him to do so.”96 And though
the Court acknowledged that “additional benefits” (deterrence)
would attend to the adoption of the proffered third-party standing
rule, the Court found that this fact did not “justify further
encroachment” upon the prosecutorial truth-seeking function.97
Despite the holding in Alderman, the Warren Court’s
exclusionary rule jurisprudence was progressive. During that
era, the exclusionary rule had been extended to the states, was
considered a constitutional mandate, and had provided a broad
base of individuals with standing to contest unconstitutional
government conduct. This period of expansion soon gave way to
an extended period of contraction, however, which severely
undercut the promising attributes of Mapp and Jones. This era
of investigative permissiveness will be discussed in Part II.
II. THE POST–WARREN COURT YEARS: THE ERA OF
PERMISSIVENESS AND THEWHITTLINGDOWN OF
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
Professor Francis Allen suggested that by the late 1960s,
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence may have
become more “mainstream” given American society’s increasing
concern with violent crime.98 He posited that the Court might
94 Id. at 171-76.
95 Id. at 174.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 174-75.
98 As noted earlier, the decisions of the Warren Court were not uniformly
expansive of individual liberties. Fourth Amendment cases such as Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1969), and Fifth Amendment cases such as United State v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966), attest to this fact. And there were more. For example, in Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the Court held that the defendant’s incriminating comments
made in various locations, including his hotel room in the presence of a cooperating
government agent, violated neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendments, given Hoffa’s
misplaced confidence in the undercover agent and the voluntariness of his statements. Id.
at 300-04. Also, in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251 (1969), and Chapman v.
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have “lost its ‘impetus’ for imposing new constitutional
standards”99 and that cases such as Terry v. Ohio, decided in
1968, are an exemplar of this shift.100 Whatever the merits of this
claim, it is clear that many significant cases and the individual
rights that were founded and expanded during the Warren Court
years were scaled back in the years that followed.
A. Identification Procedures
One such area of contraction was the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. In United States v. Wade, the Court held that the
defendant, who had been indicted at the time of his lineup
identification procedure, was entitled to have counsel present at
his lineup identification pursuant to the Sixth Amendment.101
Within six years of Wade, the Court decided Kirby v. Illinois102
and United States v. Ash,103 which limited Wade’s scope. In Kirby,
the Court did not extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
an unindicted individual who had been subjected to a lineup
identification procedure.104 And in Ash, the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not extend to an indicted
defendant who challenged the constitutionality of a photo-
identification procedure.105 As noted by Professor Israel, “the
Wade ruling now stands as a narrow exception to the general
rules governing identification procedures,” given “that the effect of
Kirby is to restrict sharply the practical application of the Wade
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that violations of a defendant’s
constitutional rights (except those considered “basic to a fair trial”) are subject to a
harmless error analysis and do not require automatic reversal. Harrington, 395 U.S. at
251-52; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24.
99 Israel, supra note 30, at 1346.
100 Id. at 1346-47. Israel referenced his former colleague at the University of
Michigan Law School, the late Francis Allen, who cited Terry as such an example.
Israel writes:
Professor Allen suggests that Terry and other Court decisions in the late 1960s
may indicate that the Court was being forced back into the mainstream of a
community consensus primarily concerned with effective law enforcement.
Such a shift would have been quite understandable in light of the intense
reactions to violent crime and riots during the late 1960s. If the Warren Court
had indeed started such a shift, then the Burger Court might be viewed in a
quite different light when compared with its predecessor.
Id. at 1347 (footnote omitted).
101 Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27.
102 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
103 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
104 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90.
105 Ash, 413 U.S. at 321.
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ruling, since police ordinarily can arrange for pre-charge lineups
and thus bypassWade.”106
B. TheMiranda Rule
In Miranda, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment
requires that a defendant who is in custody be informed of his
right to remain silent and his right to counsel prior to the
commencement of police interrogation.107 But the Court has
steadily chipped away at these protections. For instance, the
Court has held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda
can be used for impeachment purposes;108 the Miranda rule does
not apply to undercover police interrogation;109 to invoke the
right to remain silent or the right to counsel, an individual must
affirmatively and unambiguously invoke the asserted right;110
absent a clear invocation of either his right to remain silent or
his right to counsel, officers may commence questioning
immediately following the provision of Miranda warnings;111 an
individual who invokes his right to remain silent can be re-
Mirandized at a later time;112 and the exclusionary rule extends
neither to the physical fruits obtained by virtue of a Miranda-
defective statement,113 nor to statements that are obtained after
a defective provision of theMiranda warnings, provided that the
suspect was properly re-Mirandized.114
By any measure, in the post-Warren era, the Court
strengthened the government’s hand while weakening the
individual’s. The Court significantly facilitated the police’s ability
to obtain out-of-court identifications and confessions, and it made
it more difficult for individuals to avail themselves of Miranda’s
safeguards. This same erosive trend is equally evident in the
context of the exclusionary rule.
106 Israel, supra note 30, at 1366, 1368.
107 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
108 Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (2009).
109 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
110 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010); Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994).
111 Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381.
112 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
113 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
114 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
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C. The Exclusionary Rule
As noted, the Court in Mapp held that the exclusionary
rule was a constitutionally mandated remedy that applied to the
states.115 But since Mapp, the Court has significantly backpedaled.
In a series of cases, the Court has consistently recast the
exclusionary rule as a nonconstitutional remedy that should be
applied only when sufficient deterrence can be achieved.116
1. Good Faith Exception
The emphasis on deterrence has been particularly notable
in a litany of cases pertaining to what has been commonly
referred to as the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.
The Court established this principle in United States v. Leon.117 In
Leon, at issue was whether the exclusionary rule should apply
when a search warrant is issued and reasonably relied upon by
the executing officer but where it is later determined that there
was no probable cause to issue the warrant.118 The Court held
that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in situations where, as
in Leon, the officer reasonably relied upon the warrant.119 In
reaching this decision, the Court focused on the deterrent
rationale underlying the exclusionary rule and asked whether
application of the rule would further this objective.120 It concluded
that the magistrate judges who assess warrant applications and
issue warrants would not be deterred given that they do not have
any stake in the outcome of a particular case.121 And it similarly
found that the police would not be substantially deterred when
the fault rested with the judiciary.122
115 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
116 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); see Stephen J. Markman, Six
Observations on the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 425 (1997)
(referencing various Supreme Court cases interpreting the exclusionary rule as a
nonconstitutional remedy).
116 Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 (“Post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is
not a personal constitutional right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of
the victim of the search or seizure, for any ‘[r]eparation comes too late.’ Instead, ‘the rule is a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect . . . .’” (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (citation omitted))).
117 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
118 Id. at 900.
119 Id. at 926.
120 Id. at 916-22.
121 Id. at 917.
122 Id. at 918-21; Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the
Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1084-85 (2011) (discussing Leon and the Court’s
assessment of deterrence upon officers and the judiciary).
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As a prelude to its deterrence assessment, Leon stressed
the nonconstitutional nature of the exclusionary rule. In support,
the Court stated that Mapp only “implied” that exclusion was a
constitutional mandate.123 The Court in Leon added that there is
nothing in the Fourth Amendment text that “expressly preclud[es]
the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands,” and it is
“clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure
‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.’”124 Thus, according to
Leon, the exclusionary rule “operates as ‘a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’”125
The rationales expressed in Leon, particularly the Court’s
emphasis on deterrence, have been extended to other “good faith”
contexts. In Illinois v. Krull, the Court considered whether the
exclusionary rule should apply when an officer reasonably relies
upon the validity of a state statute that authorizes a warrantless
administrative search when that statute is later found to be
unconstitutional.126 In Krull, a police detective searched an
automobile wrecking yard pursuant to an Illinois statute that
authorized such an entry.127 During this inspection, the detective
discovered evidence suggesting that some of the automobiles in
the yard had been stolen.128 Subsequent to the search, a federal
court found the statute to be unconstitutional.129
As in Leon, the Court in Krull concluded that the
evidence should not be excluded.130 In so doing, it examined the
deterrent effect that exclusion would have on the police and the
state legislature. With respect to law enforcement, the Court
found that there would be “little deterrent effect” to suppress the
evidence, given the officer’s reasonable reliance on the validity of
123 Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06 (“Language in opinions of this Court and of
individual Justices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary
corollary of the Fourth Amendment, or that the rule is required by the conjunction of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. These implications need not detain us long. The Fifth
Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time, and the Fourth
Amendment ‘has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976))).
124 Id. at 906 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
125 Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
126 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342 (1987).
127 Id. at 342-43.
128 Id. at 343. The defendant was later criminally charged with various
associated offenses. Id. at 343-44.
129 Id. at 344.
130 Id. at 349.
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the statute.131 Because the fault rested with the legislature, the
Court reasoned that penalizing law enforcement would not
further the deterrence rationale that underlies the exclusionary
rule.132 The Court also found that legislatures are not the focus
of the exclusionary rule, that there is little reason to believe that
exclusion would somehow influence the legislature’s future
conduct, and that the social costs of exclusion outweigh any
benefits that may accrue through application of the exclusionary
rule in this context.133
Arizona v. Evans was another case that involved a Fourth
Amendment breach stemming from a judicial error.134 This time,
an officer, after stopping the defendant in his automobile, entered
the defendant’s name on his patrol car’s computer and learned
that the defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant.135
Thereafter, the defendant was arrested, and the officer discovered
marijuana on the defendant’s person and in his vehicle.136 After
the police informed the court that the defendant had been
arrested, the “[c]ourt discovered that the arrest warrant
previously had been quashed and so advised the police.”137 At a
suppression hearing, the chief clerk testified that when a warrant
is quashed, it is the responsibility of the court clerk to “call[ ] and
inform[ ] the warrant section of the Sheriff’s Office” of this fact.138
Testimony from the chief clerk and a records clerk indicated that
there was nothing to suggest that the Sheriff’s Office had been
informed that the defendant’s arrest warrant had been
quashed.139 In refusing to exclude the evidence, the Court
reasoned, in part, that the exclusionary rule is designed to
influence the conduct of law enforcement, and not the judicial
staff, and that “there is no basis for believing that application of
the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a
significant effect on court employees responsible for informing the
police that a warrant has been quashed.”140
Arguably, Herring v. United States is the most significant
Supreme Court case to address the good faith exception since
131 Id.
132 Id. at 349-50.
133 Id. at 350-53; Kerr, supra note 122, at 1085 (discussing Krull and the
Court’s deterrence rationale).
134 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
135 Id. at 4.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 5.
140 Id. at 10-15; Kerr, supra note 122, at 1085-86 (reviewing Evans and the
Court’s deterrence-based reasoning).
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Leon.141 At issue in Herring was whether exclusion was required
when the fault is attributable to a police department different
from the one that effectuated the arrest.142 As more precisely
stated by the Court, “What if an officer reasonably believes there
is an outstanding arrest warrant, but that belief turns out to be
wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping error by another
police employee?”143
The Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in this
context.144 It found that because “the error was the result of
isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest,” suppression
was not warranted.145 To this point, the Court added that the
exclusionary rule is designed to punish officers who exhibit
mindsets more culpable than mere negligence.
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice
system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case
does not rise to that level.146
In language that stands in stark contrast to that in Mapp,147
the Court stated that application of the exclusionary rule in
any context was a “last resort,” that it should not apply unless
“appreciable deterrence” can be achieved, that the rule has
“substantial social costs,” and that a “high obstacle” must be
overcome prior to its imposition.148
After the decision in Herring, there was meaningful
debate regarding how broadly or narrowly the opinion should be
construed. The negligence at issue in Herring was attributable to
a law enforcement employee in a separate police department,149
and the debate over Herring’s reach centered largely on the term
141 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
142 Id. at 136-37.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 137.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 144; see TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 339 (2012). Professor Maclin noted, “First, these
assertions in Herring . . . were unprecedented and controversial. No decision prior to
Herring had asserted or even implied that suppression turns on deliberate or grossly
negligent police conduct.”MACLIN, supra, at 339.
147 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 654-56 (1961).
148 Herring, 555 U.S. at 140-41 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591
(1983); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
352-53 (1987); Pa. Bd. of Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998)).
149 Id. at 137-38.
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“attenuated.” The question was whether Herring would be
narrowly construed, thereby allowing the admission of evidence
only in situations where the negligence was attenuated, or
broadly interpreted, so as to potentially encompass scenarios
where the mistake was attributable to the law enforcement
agency who effectuated the search or seizure.150
Two years later, the Court in Davis v. United States
may have provided an answer.151 In Davis, the defendant was a
passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for a motor vehicle
violation.152 Davis was arrested for providing a false name.153
After he was handcuffed and the scene secured, the officers
searched the vehicle and found a revolver.154 Davis, a felon, was
indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and was
ultimately convicted.155
At issue was “whether to apply the exclusionary rule
when the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable
reliance on binding judicial precedent.”156 The parties agreed
that the search of the vehicle was valid under the existing law
at the time of the search.157 During the pendency of the appeal,
however, the Supreme Court issued a decision, Arizona v.
Gant,158 which altered the landscape for postarrest vehicle
searches.159 The Eleventh Circuit found that, in light of Gant,
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, but
the court declined to impose the exclusionary rule.160 It
concluded that the deterrence rationale would not be furthered
by penalizing officers who followed the law in existence at the
time of their conduct.161
The Supreme Court affirmed.162 In so holding, the Court
reiterated Herring’s limitation of the exclusionary penalty to
150 Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 463 (2009) (examining competing arguments regarding the exclusionary
rule’s future in light ofHerring, and offering his own viewpoints).
151 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
152 Id. at 235-36.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 236.
157 Id.
158 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
159 Prior to Gant, it was widely accepted that New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981), authorized an automatic search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment incident to an
arrest. Davis, 564 U.S. 239. Gant narrowed significantly the ability of an officer to perform
such a search and rendered unconstitutional the officer’s search inDavis. Id. at 239-40.
160 Davis, 564 U.S. at 239-40.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 249.
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instances of deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent police
conduct, and to situations where significant deterrence can be
achieved.163 According to Professor Tracey Maclin, Herring has
effectively gutted the exclusionary rule because the majority of
search and seizure violations involve police conduct that does
not rise to this level of culpability.164
2. Standing
Mapp’s construction of the exclusionary rule as a
constitutional remedy has since been recast by the Supreme
Court as a nonconstitutional, judicially created remedy that can
be applied in limited circumstances. What was once a required
constitutional sanction of exclusion is now a remedy of last resort.
And with this recasting has come a shift in emphasis away from a
judicial integrity rationale toward a focus on deterrence. This
section now turns its attention to an inextricably related
concept—the standing doctrine—that has also been meaningfully
contracted in the post–Warren Court years.
The Court in Jones v. United States identified four means
by which a person could establish standing to raise a Fourth
Amendment claim: by demonstrating (1) a personal privacy
interest, (2) that he was legitimately on the premises, (3) that he
had a possessory interest in the evidence seized, and (4) that he
was an intended target of a government search.165 In a series of
cases, however, the Court not only overruled Jones but also
substantially diminished the field of individuals eligible to contest
the constitutionality of governmental investigative practices.166
Eighteen years after Jones, the Court decided Rakas v.
Illinois, which enunciates the predominant threshold for raising
Fourth Amendment challenges.167 The case involved a vehicular
stop of a getaway car after a report of a robbery.168 An ensuing
search of the passenger compartment led to the recovery of a box
containing rifle shells and a sawed-off rifle.169 The items were
admitted into evidence against the defendants, who were
163 Id. at 240-41.
164 MACLIN, supra note 146, at 343.
165 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-65 (1960).
166 Rebecca J. Lauer, Fourth Amendment—The Court Further Limits Standing,
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567 (1980) (discussing and analyzing Salvucci, Rawlings,
and Payner). In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), and Florida v. Jardines, 133
S. Ct. 1409 (2013), the Supreme Court added a trespass or physical intrusion upon
property rights test.
167 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
168 Id. at 130.
169 Id.
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passengers in the car.170 The defendants challenged the
constitutionality of the search, arguing that the government’s
conduct violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.171 The
defendants, however, did not assert ownership of the car or of the
evidence admitted against them.172 The trial court denied their
motion, and its decision was affirmed based on the defendants’
lack of standing.173
The defendants, relying on Jones, set forth two bases for
standing in their case before the Supreme Court. First, they
argued that standing extended to individuals at whom a
government search was directed. Second, they submitted that
they had standing given their legitimate presence in the vehicle
where the search was performed.174
Regarding the first asserted basis for standing, the
defendants relied upon the following language in Jones:
In order to qualify as a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure” one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against
whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of
a search or seizure directed at someone else.175
The Court rejected this claim, reasoning that Fourth Amendment
rights are personal rights that cannot be asserted by third
parties.176 According to the Court, only those defendants who can
establish that their own constitutional rights were infringed can
pursue a constitutional challenge.177 It added that the italicized
language from Jones (“one against whom the search was directed”)
should not be interpreted independent of its surrounding
context,178 and to the extent a more expansive interpretation
attached to the italicized phrase, the Court “expressly reject[ed]”
it as dictum.179
Rakas acknowledged that the adoption of a third-party
standing theory “would necessarily mean a more widespread
170 Id. at 129.
171 Id. at 130.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 131.
174 Id. at 132.
175 Id. at 134-35 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)).
176 Id. at 133.
177 The Court added that individuals who are parties to a criminal action will
have ample motivation to seek constitutional redress for infringements by the police.
And, the Court added, individuals who are not parties may pursue a civil damages
remedy. Id. at 134.
178 Id. at 134-35.
179 Id. at 135.
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invocation of the exclusionary rule during criminal trials.”180
But the Court concluded, as it did in Alderman,181 that the
additional benefits that would accrue with this expanded base
would not outweigh the meaningful societal costs associated
with prosecuting individuals accused of criminal acts.182
As noted, Rakas enunciates the standard customarily
employed when determining whether an individual can have a
constitutional claim heard and adjudicated. The test is
whether the challenged search and seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the
evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in turn requires a
determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has
infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment
was designed to protect.183
The Court submitted that this standard, by shifting the focus
toward the Fourth Amendment and away from the concept of
standing, produces a more “logical” approach to resolving this
threshold issue.184
Next, the Court addressed the defendants’ contention that
their constitutional challenges should have been heard, given that
they were legitimately within the vehicle that was searched. The
Court similarly rejected this argument, and in doing so, all but
overruled Jones.185 It declared that the “legitimately on the
premises” standard “is too broad a gauge for measurement of
Fourth Amendment rights,” for it would allow individuals to
pursue Fourth Amendment challenges who have no interest in
the premises that were searched.
For example, applied literally, this statement would permit a casual
visitor who has never seen, or been permitted to visit, the basement of
another’s house to object to a search of the basement if the visitor
happened to be in the kitchen of the house at the time of the search.
Likewise, a casual visitor who walks into a house one minute before a
search of the house commences and leaves one minute after the search
ends would be able to contest the legality of the search. The first visitor
would have absolutely no interest or legitimate expectation of privacy in
the basement, the second would have none in the house, and it advances
180 Id. at 137.
181 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
182 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137-38.
183 Id. at 140.
184 Id.
185 The Court did not overrule Jones but rather fit Jones within the Rakas
rubric. It said that “Jones on its facts merely stands for the unremarkable proposition
that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so
that the Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental intrusion into
that place.” Id. at 142.
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no purpose served by the Fourth Amendment to permit either of them to
object to the lawfulness of the search.186
With Rakas’s rejection of the target and “legitimately on
the premises” theories as bases for standing, Rakas not only
reduced the universe of individuals eligible to pursue
constitutional challenges but also left Jones in tatters. In fact,
in Simmons v. United States,187 a Warren Court case decided a
mere eight years after Jones, the Court effectively undermined
the automatic standing holding in Jones. In Simmons, the
Court held that an accused’s testimony given at a pretrial
hearing could not be used against him at his subsequent
trial.188 This holding squarely addressed and resolved the self-
incrimination conundrum presented in cited by Jones.189
Two years after Rakas, Jones was finally overruled in
United States v. Salvucci.190 In Salvucci, the defendants were
indicted on charges related to the unlawful possession of stolen
mail.191 Central to the government’s case were 12 checks that the
police recovered pursuant to a search warrant that was executed
upon a residence belonging to the mother of one of the
defendants.192 The defendants challenged the admissibility of the
checks, arguing that the affidavit submitted in support of the
search warrant failed to establish probable cause.193 The district
court agreed and suppressed the evidence.194 The First Circuit
affirmed, concluding that the defendants had automatic standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the search195 and that the
warrant was not supported by probable cause.196
The Supreme Court reversed, overruling Jones in the
process.197 Citing Simmons, the Court reasoned that the self-
incrimination quandary that is the “cornerstone” of the
automatic standing principle had been resolved198 and that
Rakas addressed Jones’s concern regarding “the ‘vice’ of
186 Id.
187 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
188 Id. at 394.
189 Id.
190 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
191 Id. at 85.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 85-86. The appellate court relied on Jones in reaching its decision
regarding standing. United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094, 1097-98 (1st Cir. 1979)
(citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)).
196 Salvucci, 599 F.2d at 1096.
197 Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 89, 95.
198 Id. at 88-90.
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prosecutorial [self-]contradiction.”199 Given Rakas’s holding that
a claimant must demonstrate that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area of the search before his claim
for exclusion can be heard, the Court concluded that the issues
of criminal possession and Fourth Amendment privacy are
distinct interests. The Court stated that Rakas plainly
“establish[es] that a prosecutor may simultaneously maintain
that a defendant criminally possessed the seized good,” yet not
deprive a defendant of his Fourth Amendment protections.200
In another possession of property case decided the same
day as Salvucci, the Court in Rawlings v. Kentucky addressed
whether the ownership of property (illegal narcotics) seized
pursuant to a government search of a purse that belonged to
another individual was sufficient to establish standing.201
Specifically, the defendant argued “that, because he claimed
ownership of the drugs in [another person]’s purse, he should
be entitled to challenge the search regardless of his expectation
of privacy.”202
In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the Court acknowledged
that ownership is a factor to be considered under Rakas and
admitted that had his standing claim been heard prior to the
Rakas decision, it would have likely been meritorious.203 The
Court concluded, however, that the defendant had failed to
demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the search area, which was the purse.204 As noted by the Court,
“While petitioner’s ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one fact
to be considered in this case, Rakas emphatically rejected the
notion that ‘arcane’ concepts of property law ought to control the
ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment.”205
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the record was devoid of any
indication that the defendant had an association with the purse
“prior to that sudden bailment,” that he had any authority to
exclude others from accessing the purse, or that he took “normal
precautions to maintain his privacy.”206
Thus, Rawlings established that mere ownership of an
effect, without more, is insufficient to establish standing. Even if
the defendant in Rawlings had placed his narcotics on a table
199 Id. at 90.
200 Id. at 90-91.
201 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 103 (1980).
202 Id. at 105.
203 Id. at 105-06.
204 Id. at 104-05.
205 Id. at 105 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149-50 n.17 (1978)).
206 Id.
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inside the home where the search was performed, as opposed to
the purse, he would not have been able to establish standing
pursuant to a privacy-based rationale.207 He was in a house that
was not his own and where he had only been for a short period of
time.208 Though he was legitimately on the premises, the Court
had previously rejected that theory of standing in Rakas. His
ownership of the narcotics would have been nondeterminative,
even in this circumstance. Rakas places the emphasis on the
location of the search, and it is the claimant’s burden to
demonstrate that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
that particular space.
United States v. Payner is a prototypical example of a case
involving flagrant police misconduct that goes unpunished in the
post-Rakas world.209 In Payner, the defendant was convicted of
falsifying his tax return due to his knowing failure to state that
he had a foreign bank account.210 Central to the government’s case
was a loan guarantee agreement, which pledged funds in the
defendant’s foreign account as security for a $100,000 loan.211
Though the defendant was convicted in federal court after a bench
trial, his conviction was set aside by the district court on account
of “a flagrantly illegal search” by the government.212
The probe began in 1965 when the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) investigated the Castle Bank & Trust Company of
Nassau, Bahama Islands, after the IRS received information
regarding a suspicious account holder at the bank.213 The IRS
arranged for a private investigator, Norman Casper, to
investigate the bank and its depositors.214 Casper in turn
“cultivated his friendship” with a vice-president at the bank,
Michael Wolstencroft, and eventually introduced him to an
individual named Sybol Kennedy, who, like Casper, was a
private investigator.215 Casper, with the approval of an IRS
agent, “devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records he
knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase” during his
207 As stated in Rawlings, “Had petitioner placed his drugs in plain view, he
would still have owned them, but he could not claim any legitimate expectation of
privacy.” Id. at 106.
208 Id. at 101.
209 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
210 Id. at 728.
211 Id. at 728-29.
212 Id. at 729.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 729-30.
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upcoming trip to Miami.216 This plan was approved by an agent
at the IRS.217
After Wolstencroft arrived in Miami, he “went directly
to Kennedy’s apartment” before they left to go to dinner.
Moments later, Casper entered Kennedy’s apartment with a
key previously provided by Kennedy, removed Wolstencroft’s
suitcase, and delivered it to another IRS agent who photocopied
several hundred pages of incriminating documents that were
found therein.218
The district court suppressed the documents found
during the government’s search.219 Though the search did not
violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest, the
court nevertheless excluded the evidence, relying instead upon
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as well as the
federal court’s inherent supervisory authority.220 The district
court reasoned, in part, that it was “required” to impose an
exclusionary remedy in this third-party context given the
government’s “knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person’s fundamental constitutional rights.”221 It also noted that
“the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the
Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to
purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of
one individual in order to obtain evidence against third
parties.”222 The Sixth Circuit affirmed.223
The Supreme Court, however, reversed.224 Though the
Court stated that the behavior exhibited by the IRS in Payner
should not be condoned, it added that “every case of illegality”
does not mandate the exclusion of evidence.225 The Court
referenced the “considerable harm” attendant with exclusion,
as well as the “costly toll” that exclusion has on the truth-
seeking function of criminal trials.226 Citing Rakas and
Alderman, the Court also noted that the rights offended by the
216 Id. at 730.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 731.
220 Id. at 730-31.
221 Id. at 731 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 129 (N.D.
Ohio 1977)).
222 Id. at 730 (quoting Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 132-33).
223 United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206, 207 (6th Cir. 1979), rev’d, 447 U.S.
727 (1980).
224 Payner, 447 U.S. at 737.
225 Id. at 734.
226 Id.
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government’s conduct were those of a third party who was not
before the Court.227
Thus, the Supreme Court’s good faith and standing
jurisprudence has plainly and severely winnowed the scope and
efficacy of the exclusionary rule. And while the rule’s diminished
status can be traced primarily to these legal outcomes, there are
other contributing factors that should be considered.
3. Attenuated Circumstances Exception
InWong Sun v. United States, the Court adopted what has
been commonly referred to as the “attenuated circumstances”
doctrine.228 This doctrine provides that evidence that is the direct
product of an unconstitutional search or seizure may nevertheless
be admissible if the contested evidence is sufficiently attenuated
from the government infraction. In Wong Sun, the defendant
(Wong Sun) had been unconstitutionally arrested in his residence
in the absence of probable cause.229 Several days after he had been
arrested, arraigned, and released on his own recognizance, Wong
Sun went to a police station and gave an incriminating
statement.230 The Court acknowledged the link between the
unconstitutional actions of law enforcement and Wong Sun’s
subsequent statement but held that the taint from the illegal
arrest had sufficiently dissipated.231 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court largely relied on the passage of time between Wong
Sun’s release from custody and his subsequent confession.232
Like the good faith exception, the attenuated
circumstances doctrine recognizes that there is a constitutional
infraction, and the incriminating evidence that is found is a
227 Id. at 735 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S., 128, 137 (1978); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969)).
228 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
229 Id. at 491.
230 Id.
231 The Court held “that the connection between the arrest and the statement
had ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’” Id. (quoting Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
232 Id. Fifteen years after Wong Sun, the Court decided United States v. Ceccolini,
435 U.S. 268 (1978). There, the Court applied the attenuated circumstances doctrine in a
situation involving the fruit (a live witness) stemming from an unconstitutional act by the
police (an illegal search of an envelope). Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 270. The Court stated that
attenuation is more likely to occur in circumstances where, as in Ceccolini, the derivative
fruit is testimonial, as opposed to physical, in nature. Id. at 276-77. It added that witnesses,
unlike physical evidence, have free will that can be exercised with independence. Id. As the
Court stated: “Witnesses can, and often do, come forward and offer evidence entirely of their
own volition. And . . . the degree of free will necessary to dissipate the taint will very likely
be found more often in the case of live-witness testimony than other kinds of evidence.” Id.
1150 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
byproduct of that breach. In the good faith context, a court
forgives the illegality because the officers executed the search or
seizure in reasonable reliance that their actions were authorized.233
In the attenuated circumstances situation, a court, in deciding to
bypass the exclusionary rule, reasons that the taint from the
unconstitutional conduct has sufficiently dissipated. In Wong
Sun, it cannot be seriously contended that, absent the defendant’s
illegal arrest, he would have simply decided to travel to the police
station and incriminate himself. Rather, the connection between
the unconstitutional arrest and the statements is clear. But the
passage of time while out on release is what, in the Court’s view,
sufficiently lessened the taint from the earlier infraction so as to
bypass application of the exclusionary rule.
In Hudson v. Michigan, the Court employed the
attenuation doctrine to justify its end result and expanded the
concept beyond its original construction in Wong Sun.234 Hudson
involved a violation of the knock-and-announce rule by local police
officers.235 At issue was whether that breach warranted the
exclusion of evidence (drugs and firearms) found within a
residence.236 The Court answered this question in the negative.237
The majority reasoned that “exclusion may not be premised on
the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ cause
of obtaining evidence.”238 While such causation is a necessary
prerequisite for exclusion, the Court found that it is insufficient in
and of itself.239 It determined that this threshold condition was not
satisfied inHudson.240
In reaching this conclusion, the Court somehow dismissed
Mapp’s explicit pronouncements regarding the “wide scope” of
exclusion as “expansive dicta.”241 And the Court stressed that it
has “long since” moved away from the notion that a constitutional
violation necessitates exclusion.242 As the Court explained in
Hudson, the
illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the
evidence. Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the
233 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909, 926 (1984).
234 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
235 This rule provides that generally, officers must announce their presence
prior to entering a residence. Id. at 588-89.
236 Id. at 588.
237 Id. at 594.
238 Id. at 592.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 591.
242 Id.
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police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and
would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house. But even
if the illegal entry here could be characterized as a but-for cause of
discovering what was inside, we have “never held that evidence is
‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because ‘it would not have come to
light but for the illegal actions of the police.’”243
The Court also added a new, expanded dimension with
respect to the attenuation doctrine. It stated that “[a]ttenuation
can occur . . . when the causal connection is remote.”244 This was
the situation in Wong Sun.245 But the Court added that
attenuation can also occur in situations involving more direct
associations. It explained that attenuation can exist in
circumstances where “the interest protected by the constitutional
guarantee that has been violated would not be served by
suppression of the evidence obtained.”246 It noted that the
interests of the knock-and-announce rule are concerned with
officer and public safety, the protection of property, and individual
privacy and dignity.247 But the Court declared,
What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected, however, is
one’s interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking
evidence described in a warrant. Since the interests that were violated
in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable.248
The following subsection briefly discusses two additional
exceptions to the exclusionary rule—the independent source and
inevitable discovery doctrines—that have further contributed to
the erosion of individual constitutional safeguards.
4. Independent Source and Inevitable Discovery
Doctrines
The independent source doctrine allows for the
admissibility of evidence, despite a constitutional breach, if the
government can demonstrate that it had a source for the evidence
that was independent of the government’s tainted conduct. In
Segura v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed whether
the exclusionary rule should apply in a situation where the police
had unconstitutionally entered a residence and later seized
243 Id. at 592 (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984)).
244 Id. at 593.
245 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963).
246 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593.
247 Id. at 594.
248 Id.
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evidence therein pursuant to a search warrant that was based
upon information known to the officers prior to the entry.249
The Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in this
context, reasoning that the officers had a valid independent
source for the evidence that was seized.250 It explained that the
warrant affidavit did not contain any information derived from
the initial entry into the apartment but rather contained
information “from sources wholly unconnected with the entry
and [that] was known to the agents well before the initial
entry.”251 Given that the search executed pursuant to the
warrant was “wholly unrelated to the prior entry,” the Court
found that it was “beyond dispute” that the agents had an
independent source for the evidence recovered.252 Thus, in
situations where there is a legitimate source for the seized
evidence that is truly independent of the unconstitutional
conduct, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.253
A related concept involves what is commonly referred to as
the inevitable discovery doctrine. In essence, this rule provides
that evidence that is initially seized in violation of the
Constitution may still be admitted at trial if it would have been
inevitably discovered in a lawful fashion.254 The rule often
presents itself in the context of automobile stops, and the
following is a common scenario. Assume that an officer conducts a
valid vehicle stop and arrest of the driver. Thereafter, the officer
performs an unconstitutional search of the car, which reveals
incriminating evidence. Rather than suppress the evidence on
account of a constitutionally infirm search, a court will often
permit the evidence on the theory that it would have inevitably
been discovered255 (e.g., via an inventory search).256
249 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 797-98 (1984).
250 Id. at 814.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 The Supreme Court addressed a comparable issue in Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533 (1988). There, officers unconstitutionally entered a warehouse and saw
marijuana. About eight hours later, they secured a search warrant for the premises but
made no mention of the earlier entry or of the evidence that they observed. The Court
concluded that the independent source doctrine could apply in this circumstance, provided
that the subsequent entry was warranted independent of the earlier breach. The case was
remanded with instructions to make a determination as to this issue. Id. at 535-37.
254 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44, 443 n.4 (1984).
255 The constitutionality of inventory searches has been upheld by the
Supreme Court. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462
U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
256 An automobile inventory search is typically performed by the police at a
police station (or some alternate location) after a car has been towed. Following their
department policy, officers will search those areas of the car allowed under the policy,
retrieve the items from those areas, and account in detail for the belongings that are
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Parts I and II of this article examined the evolution of
Supreme Court criminal procedure jurisprudence from the
Warren Court era to the present day, with particular attention
devoted to the exclusionary rule and standing. Together, they
demonstrated how, since the close of the Warren Court era,
individual liberties have been significantly curtailed while law
enforcement’s investigative authority has greatly expanded. Part
III discusses the adverse impact that the era of investigative
permissiveness has had on police culture and officer performance
and introduces a third-party standing proposal designed to help
remedy the problem of police malfeasance.
III. A THIRD-PARTY STANDING PROPOSAL
A. The Influence of Police Organizational Culture
The expansive interpretative approach to individual
liberties that characterized the Warren Court has since been
replaced with a more conservative construction model. Since the
end of this era, police investigative authority has greatly
increased, the exclusionary rule—no longer a constitutional
mandate—has lost most of its teeth, and the landscape of
individuals eligible to present Fourth Amendment challenges has
been significantly curtailed.
When the Supreme Court issues a decision, it sends a
message not only to the litigants but also to society as a whole.
People pay attention, particularly those who are directly or
indirectly impacted by the Court’s rulings. And this is especially
true when the Court issues a series of rulings over the course of
many years that are relatively consistent in their messages. In
Section II.C.4, this article discussed Segura v. United States,
where the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule given the
existence of an independent source for the seized evidence.257
In his dissent, Justice Stevens expressed his concern
regarding the message that the Court’s holding conveyed not only
to “the leaders of the law enforcement community,” but also to
investigative agents.
recovered. The rationale for such searches is that it safeguards the belongings of the
arrested individual, protects the police from claims associated with the property, and
mitigates the risk of potential safety hazards in the vehicle. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at
368-75 (explaining the automobile inventory search and finding that the routine search of
defendant’s locked car, which had been lawfully impounded, was not unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, as there were valuable items in plain view and the procedures
used were standard across the nation).
257 Segura, 468 U.S. at 814; see infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
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The Court’s disposition, I fear, will provide government agents with an
affirmative incentive to engage in unconstitutional violations of the
privacy of the home.
. . . .
. . . [W]e should consider the impact of the Court’s holding on the
leaders of the law enforcement community . . . . A rule of law that is
predicated on the absurd notion that a police officer does not have the
skill required to obtain a valid search warrant in less than 18 or 20
hours, or that fails to deter the authorities from delaying unreasonably
their attempt to obtain a warrant after they have entered a home, is
demeaning to law enforcement and can only encourage sloppy,
undisciplined procedures.
. . . [T]he Court’s rhetoric cannot disguise the fact that when it not
only tolerates but also provides an affirmative incentive for warrantless
and plainly unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into the home, the
resulting erosion of the sanctity of the home is a “price” paid by the
innocent and guilty alike.258
Justice Stevens’s comments reflect an understanding that the
Court’s decisions influence law enforcement departments,
which in turn influence the conduct of their officers and agents.
Prior to and since Segura, the Court has steadily sent signals
to the law enforcement community that the Court is willing to
forgive police misconduct. That same year, for instance, the
Court decided Leon, which was the first of a series of “good
faith” exception rulings that have excused unconstitutional law
enforcement conduct in a host of settings.259
The introduction to this article noted the tragic case of
Walter Scott, who was killed by a police officer in North
Charleston, South Carolina.260 As noted, Officer Slager was
relieved of his duties and later indicted for murder.261 And while
disciplinary and legal steps are unquestionably necessary and
proper, the powerful influence of organizational culture within
police departments should not be overlooked as a possible
contributing factor to such unfortunate outcomes.
Professor Armacost discounts the “officer-gone-bad
explanation”262 that is so readily set forth by law enforcement
leadership in situations such as the Scott murder.263 Rather, she
258 Segura, 468 U.S. at 817, 838-39 (Stevens J., dissenting).
259 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see supra notes 134-68 and
accompanying text.
260 See Blinder & Williams, supra note 1.
261 See id.; Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra note 4.
262 Armacost, supra note 19, at 456.
263 Alan Blinder & Marc Santora, Officer Who Killed Walter Scott Is Fired, and
Police Chief Denounces Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
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submits, police organizations are often culpable as well. With this
I agree. Police organizations have cultures that positively or
negatively influence officer behaviors. Organizations with norms
and expectations that encourage constitutional compliance
discourage unnecessarily aggressive police conduct. On the other
hand, organizations that tolerate, and thus fail to tame,
unconstitutional behaviors help foster aggressive police practices.
As Professor Armacost stated,
[T]he impulse to isolate misbehaving officers as “rogue cops” is,
essentially, a search for scapegoats. While punishing individual
miscreants may satisfy society’s thirst for someone to blame, it also
causes us to miss important systemic and organizational causes that lie
behind individual acts of brutality.264
Whether the problems associated with police culture can
ever be fully and adequately addressed is highly doubtful. But
what can be achieved are more limited successes, which can,
hopefully, make meaningful improvements in police culture and
in turn produce greater constitutional respect and compliance by
police. Toward this end, this article submits that through an
unprecedented expansion of the standing doctrine in the
exclusionary rule context, this positive change can occur.
B. Third-Party Standing Proposal and the Analogy to
Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection
This article advocates for a form of third-party standing
that would allow criminal defendants to challenge the
constitutionality of government actions to the same extent as a
first-party claimant. In other words, a third-party challenger
would possess the same right to exclude as the individual whose
Fourth Amendment interests had been implicated by the
government. There would be no difference in the breadth of the
right to exclude, since criminal defendants, as third-party
advocates, would in effect be standing in the shoes of the individual
who was personally aggrieved by the government’s conduct.
This proposed, bright-line measure extends well beyond
those bases identified in Jones. If, for example, the government
performs a search of a residence and seeks to admit at a criminal
trial the derivatively seized evidence against a defendant who had
no privacy interest in the premises, standing would nevertheless
2015/04/09/us/walter-scott-shooting-video-stopped-case-from-being-swept-under-rug-family-
says.html?smid=pl-share [http://perma.cc/9AAZ-XQ4X].
264 Armacost, supra note 19, at 493.
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extend to that defendant. Thus, standing in this setting rests
neither upon a demonstration of a personal privacy expectation,
as Rakas mandates,265 nor upon proof of legitimate presence, a
possessory interest, or identification as a government target, as
required in Jones.266
Ironically, by expanding the field of potential challengers
to governmental misconduct, this proposal would further the
deterrence rationale that the Court has strenuously emphasized
as the principle justification for the exclusionary rule. Police
organizations, forced to confront the vast landscape of potential
challengers to their conduct, will have little choice but to adjust
their internal culture to encourage greater adherence to
constitutional limitations.267
The foundation for the third-party standing proposal can
be directly traced to a series of Supreme Court cases in the context
of racial discrimination in jury selection. Batson v. Kentucky, the
seminal Supreme Court pronouncement on this subject, concerned
a black defendant charged with second-degree burglary and receipt
of stolen goods.268 He argued that the government violated, inter
alia, his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights when it
employed its peremptory challenges to strike all four prospective
black jurors from the petit jury.269 The Court held that “the Equal
Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential
jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that
black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the
State’s case against a black defendant.”270
Referencing Strauder v. West Virginia,271 the Court stated
that it was well established that a black defendant is denied
equal protection when he is subjected to a jury trial where
265 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978).
266 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-67 (1960).
267 Steiker, supra note 21, at 2505-06 (“[T]he threshold requirement of standing,
although not always conceived of as an ‘exception’ to the exclusionary rule, in fact operates
to limit the scope of exclusion in ways that seem to run counter to the deterrence rationale
offered for the rule. The standing doctrine holds that only a defendant whose personal
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the government’s misconduct can move to
exclude the evidence that the government illegally seized. Many have noted that this
doctrine is hard to square with the rationale of deterrence, given that the aggrieved or
nonaggrieved nature of the defendant has no connection at all to the deterrent effect of a
successful motion to suppress. But the Warren Court and the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
alike have insisted on a ‘personal rights’ view of standing to invoke the exclusionary rules,
even while acknowledging that the primary rationale for the rule is deterrence of official
misconduct.” (footnotes omitted)).
268 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
269 Id. at 82-83.
270 Id. at 89.
271 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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“members of his race have been purposefully excluded.”272 It
added that “[e]xclusion of black citizens from service as jurors
constitutes a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to cure.”273 Though the Constitution
does not afford a defendant a right to have members of his race
included within the petit jury, the Court noted that the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees that the jury selection process will
not be discriminatory.274
Notably, the Court held that a discriminatory jury
selection procedure offends not only the equal protection rights of
the criminal defendant but also the constitutional rights of the
jurors who were wrongfully excused.275 The Court declared that
“[a]s long ago as Strauder, . . . the Court recognized that by
denying a person participation in jury service on account of his
race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the
excluded juror.”276 Given that the defendant and the excluded
jurors in Batson were of the same race, the Court did not expound
much further upon the constitutional interests of the jurors in
this context. Obviously, one of the questions unresolved by Batson
was a third-party standing question—namely, whether an
individual could maintain a Batson claim when the excluded juror
was of a race different than the defendant.
Powers v. Ohio addressed this issue.277 In Powers, the
defendant, who was white, objected when the prosecutor used
272 Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 85-87. The Court stated that to make a prima facie showing of
purposeful discrimination, the defendant
must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant’s race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the
fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a
jury selection practice that permits “those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate.” Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice
to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This
combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the
venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
. . . .
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State
to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.
Id. at 96-97 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (citations omitted)).
275 Id. at 87.
276 Id. The Court added that such discriminatory practices adversely impact
the defendant, the excluded jurors, and the community at large, and “undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” Id.
277 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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several of his peremptory challenges to exclude prospective
black jurors.278 His objections were overruled, and he was
ultimately convicted.279 On appeal, he argued that the
prosecutor’s actions violated, inter alia, his equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.280 The sole question
before the Court was “whether, based on the Equal Protection
Clause, a white defendant may object to the prosecution’s
peremptory challenges of black venirepersons.”281
As a preliminary matter, the Court held that when the
government strikes prospective jurors solely on account of their
race, it violates the stricken jurors’ equal protection rights. As
stated by the Court,
We hold that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor
from using the State’s peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise
qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by reason of
their race, a practice that forecloses a significant opportunity to
participate in civic life. An individual juror does not have a right to
sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right
not to be excluded from one on account of race.282
Given this conclusion, the Court turned its attention to whether
the defendant had a right to assert the equal protection claims of
the aggrieved jurors.283 The Court answered in the affirmative.284
The Court readily acknowledged that typically a party establishes
standing when the litigant “assert[s] his or her own legal rights
and interests,” as opposed to the rights and interests of other
individuals.285 Nevertheless, the majority noted that the Court
has recognized an exception to this general principle by allowing
for third-party standing in certain situations.
To qualify, the Court identified three preconditions286:
The litigant must have suffered an “injury in fact,” thus giving him
or her a “sufficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party;
and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to
protect his or her own interests.287
278 Id. at 402-03.
279 Id. at 403.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 404.
282 Id. at 409.
283 Id. at 410.
284 Id. at 415.
285 Id. at 410.
286 Id. at 410-11.
287 Id. at 411 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-16 (1976)).
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The Court found that all three criteria were satisfied in Powers.
First, the Court found that the defendant sustained a “cognizable
injury,” which provided him with “a concrete interest in
challenging the practice.”288 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied on rationales premised largely on judicial integrity
interests. It reasoned that “racial discrimination in the selection
of jurors ‘casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process,’ and
places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt.”289 According
to the Court, when a prosecutor practices racial discrimination
during the course of jury selection, it taints both the fact and
perception of the fairness of the criminal trial.290 It added that
racial discrimination of this sort is an “overt wrong, often
apparent to the entire jury panel” that “casts doubt over the
obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere
to the law throughout the trial of the cause.”291
Second, the Court concluded that the elimination of
courtroom racial discrimination is an objective commonly shared
by criminal defendants and those who have been wrongly excused
from jury service on account of race.292 The Court stated that
prospective jurors who are subject to racially discriminatory
strikes and criminal defendants who are unable to voice
complaints about such a process “may lose confidence in the court
and its verdicts.”293 Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was
“necessary and appropriate” to permit a criminal defendant to
advocate for the rights of the excluded jurors in this context.294 It
further found that Powers would be a “motivated, effective
advocate,” given that a successful demonstration that the
government engaged in racially discriminatory practices during
jury selection “may lead to the reversal of a conviction.”295
288 Id.
289 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
290 Id.
291 Id. at 412. The Court found that
[t]he purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant
and the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is
given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair. The verdict will not
be accepted or understood in these terms if the jury is chosen by unlawful
means at the outset. Upon these considerations, we find that a criminal
defendant suffers a real injury when the prosecutor excludes jurors at his or
her own trial on account of race.
Id. at 413.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 414.
294 Id.
295 Id.
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Third, the Court found that prospective jurors stricken on
account of their race would not be sufficiently motivated to pursue
their legal interests. The Court noted certain “daunting”
procedural and practical hindrances to pursuing litigation.296 As
an example, it cited the improbability of obtaining declaratory or
injunctive relief, since “it would be difficult for an individual juror
to show a likelihood that discrimination against him at the voir
dire stage will recur.”297 The Court added that meaningful
practical barriers exist as well, such as “the small financial stake
involved and the economic burdens of litigation.”298
Since Powers, the Court has extended this third-party
standing rationale to racially discriminatory selection cases
involving a Louisiana state grand jury,299 a civil trial jury
involving private litigants,300 and a criminal jury trial involving
peremptory strikes exercised by criminal defendants.301 In these
cases, as well as in Batson and Powers, the Supreme Court found
that racial discrimination in jury and grand jury selection
procedures impacts fundamental values central to our sense of
justice and fairness. And in the Court’s view, if such
discriminatory practices were allowed to persist without judicial
intervention, the actual and perceived fairness of the criminal
justice system would be immeasurably harmed.
As noted by the Court in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.,
Race discrimination within the courtroom raises serious questions as to
the fairness of the proceedings conducted there. Racial bias mars the
integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic
government from becoming a reality. In the many times we have
addressed the problem of racial bias in our system of justice, we have
not “questioned the premise that racial discrimination in the
qualification or selection of jurors offends the dignity of persons and the
integrity of the courts.”302
296 Id.
297 Id. at 414-15.
298 Id. at 415.
299 Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998). This third-party rationale has
also been extended to gender discrimination in the jury selection process. See J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (holding that gender discrimination in jury
selection violates the Equal Protection Clause); Tania Tetlow, Granting Prosecutors
Constitutional Rights to Combat Discrimination, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1117, 1127 (2012)
(“In the Batson line of cases, the Court allows both sides to raise the equal protection
rights of potential jurors against the use of peremptory challenges based on race or
gender.” (footnote omitted)).
300 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
301 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
302 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628 (citations omitted) (quoting Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991)).
2016] POLICING IN THE ERA OF PERMISSIVENESS 1161
These same concerns of integrity and fairness arise in the
exclusionary rule context. Whereas the jury selection cases
address unconstitutional practices that occur in the courtroom,
the unconstitutional practices in the exclusionary rule realm
pertain to government investigative conduct that leads to the
trial. Absent such conduct, there would be neither a trial nor jury
selection. Government investigative activity is the heart of any
criminal case. And when such critical acts involve unconstitutional
government activity, the Court’s forgiveness of such acts impacts
the same notions of real and perceived fairness that exist in the
jury selection cases. This truth is all the more evident considering
that more than 90% of all federal and state cases are resolved via
a negotiated resolution.303 This means that fewer than 10% of all
cases even have the potential for Batson and Powers claims to be
raised. Since third-party standing is necessary to combat racial
discrimination in the jury selection process, it is axiomatic that
third-party standing should be extended to allow litigants to test
the constitutionality of government investigative practices that
underlie every criminal case.
The rationales that justified the extension of third-party
standing in the Powers line of cases are, at the very least, equally
applicable in this context. First, criminal defendants have an
“injury-in-fact” that gives them a “concrete interest” in the
outcome of the case. Certainly, a criminal defendant is injured
whenever evidence seized in contravention of a third party’s
constitutional rights is potentially admissible against him at his
trial. Such evidence could lead to his conviction and loss of liberty.
This interest alone is sufficient to give him a “concrete interest” in
contesting the constitutional legitimacy of the government’s
practice. In addition, the same judicial integrity interests
identified in Powers are germane in this context. The integrity of
the criminal justice process is compromised whenever the
government disregards constitutional safeguards and escapes
sanction. The real and perceived fairness of the criminal justice
process is inevitably tainted when the system devalues a
defendant’s constitutional safeguards and punishes him for his
misconduct, yet readily forgives government misconduct.
Second, criminal defendants and individuals who have
been subjected to unconstitutional government conduct but
have not been charged with a crime have a common interest in
promoting constitutional compliance by the police, as each
303 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
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experiences adversity when constitutionally imposed boundaries
are crossed. The criminal defendant has unlawfully obtained
evidence admitted against him that can result in his conviction,
while humiliation, inconvenience, and stress afflict both the
defendant and the aggrieved citizen. Moreover, the criminal
defendant is highly motivated to serve as a third-party advocate
given that a successful outcome could lead to the dismissal of the
charges against him.
Lastly, third parties who are aggrieved by unconstitutional
government practices will rarely be motivated to assert their legal
interests. There are embedded legal impediments such as the
Eleventh Amendment, which provides absolute immunity to the
states from civil damages,304 and qualified immunity, which shields
officers in their individual capacity provided that the officers did
“not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”305
In addition, there are practical barriers to initiating legal
action. In commenting on these practical influences, Professor
Alexander explains that the disinclination among the innocent to
seek legal redress is rooted largely in a fear of law enforcement
and a distrust of the legal process.306 These practical factors are
especially ubiquitous in minority communities, particularly in
instances where an innocent person has been subjected to an
unfortunate police encounter, such as an unconstitutional search
or seizure. As noted by Professor Alexander,
Court cases involving drug-law enforcement almost always involve
guilty people. Police usually release the innocent on the street—often
without a ticket, citation, or even an apology—so their stories are
rarely heard in court. Hardly anyone files a complaint, because the
last thing most people want to do after experiencing a frightening and
intrusive encounter with the police is show up at the police station
where the officer works and attract more attention to themselves. For
good reason, many people—especially poor people of color—fear police
harassment, retaliation, and abuse. After having your car torn apart
by the police in a futile search for drugs, or being forced to lie spread
eagled on the pavement while the police search you and interrogate
you for no reason at all, how much confidence do you have in law
enforcement? Do you expect to get a fair hearing? Those who try to
find an attorney to represent them in a lawsuit often learn that unless
304 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.”); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890).
305 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
306 ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 69-70.
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they have broken bones (and no criminal record), private attorneys are
unlikely to be interested in their case.307
Professor Alexander’s conclusion that the innocent are
disinclined to pursue legal remedies is reinforced when one
compares the personal characteristics of jury versus nonjury
populations. According to Professor Kim Forde-Mazrui, jury
venires are typically drawn from voter registration lists, which for
a variety of reasons tend to be underinclusive of minority citizens
in the community.308 He observes, for example, that minorities are
less likely to receive jury summonses sent to them in the mail,
given the greater residential mobility among minority
populations.309 Moreover, he submits that minorities are more
likely to be excused from jury service on account of financial
hardship, childcare difficulties, and criminal history.310 These facts
are notable given the Court’s finding in the Powers line of cases
that potential trial jury and grand jury members are not likely to
assert their equal protection rights against the police.
Certainly the impediments to the pursuit of legal redress
apply equally irrespective of the juror/nonjuror classification of
the potential claimant. But the practical realities suggest a
difference in outcomes. Financial hardships, personal and family
structural issues, and police-community relational divisions are
identified less with juror populations than with nonjuror
communities. Accordingly, such factors strongly insinuate that
juror populations would be better positioned to assert legal
claims than the broader cross-sections of the communities in
which they reside.
Individuals who are serving criminal sentences involving
some form of community supervision also have a disincentive to
pursue legal claims against law enforcement.311 This reality
becomes clearer when considering the various conditions of
release that must be adhered to and the penalties (including
incarceration) that can be imposed for noncompliance. Though the
probationary conditions imposed by a court are often tailored to
307 Id.
308 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through
Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 356 (1999).
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Individuals with criminal records tend to be more heavily represented in
nonjuror populations. The Department of Justice estimated that by the close of 2012,
approximately 1 in 50 adults in the United States were under some form of community
supervision, and a majority of these individuals were minorities. LAURA M. MARUSCHAK
& THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION
ANDPAROLE IN THEUNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (2013) (revised Jan. 21, 2015).
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the individual defendant, the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
which provide guidance to federal courts regarding sentencing
matters, classifies certain conditions as “mandatory” and others
as “standard,” or merely recommended. One such “mandatory”
requirement is that a probationer must refrain from committing
another criminal act.312 Listed “standard” conditions include that
a “defendant . . . refrain from excessive use of alcohol,” that he
“not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any
controlled substance,” and that he associate neither with “persons
engaged in criminal activity” nor “with any person convicted of a
felony.”313 Probationers and parolees, fearful of having their status
revoked due to a violation of one or more of their release
conditions, would be highly motivated to avoid any situation
(including pursuing legal action against the police) that would
bring attention to conduct or associations that might be deemed to
violate their release obligations.314
Another such hindrance impacts individuals who, due to
financial hardship, reside in public housing. For example, 42
U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) provides that a tenant may be evicted for
“drug-related criminal activity” on or near his premises when
committed by the tenant, a member of his or her household, or
even a guest under his or her control.315 Faced with the prospect
of eviction, public housing tenants, including those wholly
innocent of criminal activity, will be highly reluctant to engage
in any activity, such as the filing of a lawsuit against the police,
that will heighten attention to activities within or near their
premises that might trigger their eviction.
Thus, the Powers rationales apply with equal if not greater
force in the exclusionary rule context. The government’s
investigative conduct is the foundation upon which a criminal case
is built. When the evidence gathered by the government to prove a
312 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINESMANUAL § 5B1.3(a)(1) (2014).
313 Id. §§ 5B1.3(c)(7), (9).
314 Relatedly, individuals might be afraid to file legal actions out of fear that
they or someone with whom they are close could be subject to deportation. Section 1227
of Title 8 details a laundry list of deportable acts, including being convicted of certain
criminal offenses or being determined to be a drug abuser or an addict (which does not
require a conviction). 8 U.S.C. § 1227(A)(2) (2012).
315 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (2012). Subsection (l)(6) provides
that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity
on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the
tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall
be cause for termination of tenancy.
Id. § 1437d(l)(6).
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defendant’s guilt is obtained through unconstitutional methods, the
integrity of the justice system suffers and the defendant is
personally and adversely impacted. The interests of the criminal
defendant and the individuals aggrieved by unconstitutional
government conduct are closely aligned. A criminal defendant is a
highly motivated advocate to litigate not only his own interests but
also those of the third party in whose shoes he stands. This fact is
of added significance when considered in the context of the array of
legal and practical barriers that render it highly unlikely that a
third party will seek legal redress.
CONCLUSION
The post–Warren Court era of the Supreme Court is
characterized by a jurisprudence that is highly deferential to law
enforcement interests. This is especially true in the exclusionary
rule and related standing doctrine contexts. Cognizant of the
investigative freedoms that the Court has steadily expanded, as
well as the Court’s forgiving exclusionary rule and standing
jurisprudence, law enforcement officers have too often been
influenced to be aggressive in their policing and dismissive of
individual constitutional safeguards.
The proposed expansion of the third-party standing
doctrine would motivate law enforcement agencies to respond to a
vast new landscape. Faced with the prospect of greatly increased
challenges to their conduct, organizational leadership would have
no other prudent alternative but to adapt and conform to this new
reality. Greater respect for constitutionally protected liberties and
decreased instances of police misconduct would be the likely
byproducts of this cultural shift.
Admittedly, this proposal is only a first step in a much
bigger reform process, for there are a multitude of factors that
underlie the problem of police misconduct that must be
addressed. For example, effectual reform would have to
ultimately include a rescission of many of the exclusionary rule
exceptions that the Court has carved out since Mapp. It would
also have to include at least some of the recommendations set
forth in the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing.316 Expansion of the standing doctrine,
316 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/G34V-P2MX]. The report proffered
several recommendations designed to help strengthen the trust between law enforcement
and the communities they serve. The recommendations include developing and refining
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particularly in the manner advocated for in this article, is a
prerequisite to generating meaningful, positive, and sustained
change both in police organizational culture and in officer
behavior on the ground. The ability to exclude ill-gotten evidence
always starts with standing. It is the gateway that defendants
must pass through in order to voice their complaints. When
enough people are afforded consistent and genuine access to the
courts, it is then that police organizations will take notice and the
wheels of change can begin to roll.
police policies that better reflect community values, strengthening and improving
community policing policies and outreach, and enhancing police training and education to
assist officers as they confront various challenges in an increasingly pluralistic nation. Id.
For an in-depth discussion of the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, see Julian Cook, Police Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Critique
of the President’s Task Force’s Final Report, 91 NOTREDAME L. REV. ONLINE 106 (2016).
